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INTRODUCTION
We live in the Information Age,1 an age in which we rely on
computers and the Internet every day and in almost every aspect of our
lives, from personal communications to business transactions to
entertainment. Along with this constant use of computers and the
Internet, however, comes a risk. In order to take advantage of the
convenience which computers provide through online shopping and
banking, for example, we must often provide our most personal
information. Unfortunately, this personal information is not always
∗

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Political Science, 2004, Northwestern University. I would like to
thank my family for their continuous love and support. Thank you also to my peers
in the SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW Honors Seminar for their invaluable help in writing
this note.
1
Glossary, Readiness for the Networked World, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/readinessguide/glossary.html (defining Information Age
as “the current stage in societal development which began to emerge at the end of the
twentieth century” and is “marked by the increased production, transmission,
consumption of and reliance on information.”).
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completely secured by the database owners who store it. In exchange
for the convenience of online dealings, therefore, we put ourselves at
risk that our personal information will be wrongfully accessed. Since
2005, there have been hundreds of publicized database security
breaches, which have affected the personal data of more than two
hundred million people.2
With little legal precedent regarding liability surrounding database
security breaches, there is great uncertainty as to who should bear the
costs—consumers or database owners—associated with providing
personal information for online transactions. Should consumers bear
the costs in return for the conveniences of online transactions, or
should database owners bear the costs in return for the opportunity to
develop their business over the Internet?
Consumers throughout the country who have been affected by
database security breaches have begun to bring civil lawsuits against
database owners to place liability on them for these breaches. The
Seventh Circuit first dealt with such a situation in Pisciotta v. Old
National Bancorp.3 The consumers in this case brought their action
against the database owner under claims of negligence and breach of
contract.4 The issue that the Seventh Circuit dealt with in examining
these claims was whether the plaintiffs had suffered the requisite harm,
considering their personal information was wrongfully accessed but no
identity theft or other fraud resulted from the security breach.5 The
Seventh Circuit was rather definitive in its ruling that the plaintiffs had
not suffered the requisite harm to place liability on the database owner.
Pisciotta, therefore, raises significant concerns for consumers. It also
suggests important implications for the future of database security
breach cases, which embody a new intersection of privacy law and tort
law.

2

See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, available
at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm.
3
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
4
Id. at 632.
5
Id. at 635.
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This Note examines Pisciotta and its effect on the state of the law
regarding liability resulting from database security breaches. Part I of
this Note reviews the background necessary to discuss Pisciotta,
which includes a basic understanding of the Internet, privacy law, and
current regulations addressing database security breaches. Part II then
examines Pisciotta, detailing the facts of the case and analyzing the
Seventh Circuit’s holding. Part III explores whether Pisciotta could
have come out differently, particularly had the court analogized the
exposure of the plaintiffs’ personal information to toxic exposure in
toxic tort cases. Part III also discusses the role of the economic loss
doctrine in database security breach cases and whether it should have
played a part in Pisciotta. Lastly, Part IV assesses what should be done
to protect consumers’ privacy interests in light of the difficulties
consumers face under current common law, as illustrated in Pisciotta.
Specifically, this Note proposes that legislation be enacted to provide
for the recovery of credit monitoring costs by affected consumers of a
database security breach.
I. BACKGROUND
Pisciotta is particularly interesting because it illustrates a new
intersection between privacy law and tort law in the context of
technology. Considering this unique intersection of the law, one must
have an understanding of certain technology, such as the Internet, as
well as knowledge of privacy law and tort law, which are implicated
because of this technology. This section provides this necessary
background and also sheds light on federal and state regulations which
address database security breaches. Through this background, one
recognizes the lack of redress for victims of database security breaches
whose personal information has been wrongfully accessed, but who
have not yet suffered identity theft or other fraud.
A. What is the Internet?
As described by some of its developers, “[t]he Internet has
revolutionized the computer and communications world like nothing
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before. . . The Internet is at once a world-wide broadcasting capability,
a mechanism for information dissemination, and a medium for
collaboration and interaction between individuals and their computers
without regard for geographic location.”6
The Internet was created in 1969 following years of research by
the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of
Defense.7 It essentially is a worldwide series of networks which can
transmit data between each other using a special language called the
Internet Protocol.8 One of the Internet’s most distinctive characteristics
is that it is a “packet switching” network.9 This means that the Internet
can break down information into packets, or formatted pieces of data,
so that it can transmit the information as quickly and efficiently as
capacity allows.10 Packets are labeled with the address of their final
destination and may then travel through different routes until they
reach their destination computer where they are reassembled.11 This
differs from more traditional communication media, where
information travels as a whole and may tie up an entire channel while
it is transmitted.12 The Internet is also controlled through “smart
communications” such that there is no centralized control of the
Internet.13 Rather, all of the computers in the worldwide network
assess the traffic of packets and control the flow of the information.14
There is thus no central authority which governs who may use the
Internet and for what purposes; it is an autonomous network.15 Lastly,
6

Barry M. Leiner, et. al., A Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society
(2003), available at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml.
7
Id.
8
Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1097-1100
(1996).
9
Id. at 1097.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 1098.
14
Id.
15
Id.
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the Internet provides for “telepresence,” meaning that the Internet is
unconstrained by geography.16 A user may “access computers, retrieve
information, or control various types of apparatus from around the
world,” while his or her physical location is unidentifiable.17 This
universe of international information that Internet users have access to
is referred to as “cyberspace.”18
The Internet was originally intended for use only by academics
and government officials; however, the Internet became much more
accessible with the development of personal home computers and
“browser” software.19 Today the Internet is widely used by businesses
and consumers and its use continues to grow exponentially. Electronic
commerce or “e-commerce,” which includes the sale and purchase of
products and services,20 has become a multi-billion dollar industry,
with approximately 259 billion dollars of online sales having been
expected in 2007.21
Although the Internet provides consumers with many benefits, it
also creates great concern for consumers who are required to provide
personal information over the Internet for e-commerce transactions.
These consumers face potential misuse of their information in several
ways. For instance, consumers are susceptible to: the reuse of their
information for purposes other than those for which they provided it;
the replication of their information to third parties; the use of their
information to commit fraud; the intrusive use of their information
such as through telemarketing; and the interception or
misappropriation of their information by third-party hacking, which

16

Id.
Id.
18
Id. at 1099.
19
Christopher F. Carlton, The Right to Privacy in Internet Commerce: A Call
for New Federal Guidelines and the Creation of an Independent Privacy
Commission, 16 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 393, 401 (2002).
20
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG, & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY,
INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 112 (2006).
21
Online Sales Spike 19 Percent, CNNMoney.com (May 14, 2007),
http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/14/news/economy/online_retailing/.
17

662
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

5

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

was at issue in Pisciotta.22 These examples of misuse of personal
information which is provided over the Internet directly implicate the
consumers’ right to privacy, which leads us to the next section
regarding privacy law.
B. Privacy Law
The concept of a right to privacy was first introduced in American
jurisprudence by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their
seminal article written in 1890, The Right to Privacy.23 They wrote,
“[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet
the demands of society.”24 Particularly, the new right they espoused in
this era of change, marked by the Industrial Revolution, was the “right
to be let alone.”25 The article was embraced by jurists throughout the
country, and courts began deciding cases by looking at different
principles of privacy.26 This led to the creation of common law causes
of action to protect an individual’s right to privacy through property,
tort, and contract law.27
The right of privacy came to the forefront of American
jurisprudence again in the mid-twentieth century when the United
States Supreme Court, through a series of decisions,28 established a
constitutional right of privacy. Although the right of privacy is not
22

FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 6-7 (2001).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
24
Id. at 193.
25
Id. Justice Louis Brandeis later wrote of “the right to be let alone” that it is
“the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26
Carlton, supra note 19, at 399.
27
Id.
28
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
23
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explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the Supreme Court found
that the “roots of this right” were implied in the “‘penumbras’ and
‘emanations’ of the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,”29 and
particularly in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.30
With the acceptance of the right of privacy in modern law, many
scholars have devoted their research to exploring exactly which
privacy interests are protected and to what extent. Professor Jerry
Kang has described privacy in terms of being “clustered into three
groupings”: privacy regarding 1) physical space, 2) decisions, and 3)
information.31 This last grouping, information privacy, is most relevant
in our discussion of the legal ramifications surrounding a database
security breach. Information privacy “concerns an individual’s control
over . . . the acquisition, disclosure, and use [] of personal
information.”32 Personal information is “information identifiable to the
individual,” meaning that it entails a connection between the
information and the person, not necessarily that it is sensitive or
private.33 Information may be identifiable to an individual when the
information 1) is authored by the individual—i.e., phone conversation
or e-mail, 2) describes the individual—i.e., birth date or mother’s
maiden name, or 3) is “instrumentally mapped to the individual for
institutional identification”—i.e., Social Security number or credit
card number.34

29

MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 8 (2007) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S.
479).
30
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
31
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1202 (1998).
32
Id. at 1203 (adopting this definition from a report by the Information
Infrastructure Task Force which was created under the Clinton administration).
33
Id. at 1206-1207.
34
Id. at 1207.
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1. Privacy Torts
Following Warren and Brandeis’s 1890 article, courts and
legislatures recognized the “right to be let alone” through case law and
statutory law.35 In 1960, Dean William Prosser cataloged the more
than three hundred privacy tort cases that were decided since the
Warren and Brandeis article, and concluded that there were four
distinct privacy torts.36 These “invasion of privacy” torts have since
been codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts37 as the following:
1) intrusion upon seclusion—when one intrudes “upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns” and where this
“intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person;”38 2)
appropriation—when “one appropriates to his own use or benefit the
name or likeness of another;”39 3) public disclosure of private facts—
when one publicly discloses a private matter that is “highly offensive
to a reasonable person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the
public;”40 and 4) false light—when one publicly discloses a matter that
places a person “in a false light” that is “highly offensive to a
reasonable person.”41
These torts, however, provide little protection of personal
information in the private sector.42 Particularly, they are not useful
against database owners who merely store information which is then
misappropriated, as was the case in Pisciotta. First, intrusion upon
seclusion does not provide a remedy in this scenario. In the context of
35

DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 18

(2003).
36

William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977).
38
Id. at § 652B.
39
Id. at § 652C.
40
Id. at § 652D.
41
Id. at § 652E.
42
Jerry Kang, supra note 31, at 1231 n.159. See Matthew C. Keck, Cookies,
The Constitution, and the Common Law: A Framework for the Right of Privacy on
the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83 (2002) for an interesting proposal of a new
tort to protect information privacy.
37
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personal information, intrusion upon seclusion looks to whether the
particular means used to collect the information is highly offensive.43
This is not helpful in e-commerce situations, where consumers
voluntarily provide information to receive goods or services; 44 there is
no problem with the means the database owner uses to obtain that
information. If any party has intruded upon seclusion in these
situations, it is the third-party hacker; however, this is immaterial
when a plaintiff seeks redress from the (wealthier) database owner.
Second, a plaintiff can only sue a database owner under
appropriation when the database owner itself uses or benefits from the
name or likeness of the consumer. This practically would only occur
when a database owner disseminates “personal information for
commercial purposes without consent.”45 That is not the situation in a
database security breach where a third party hacker has
misappropriated the information without the knowledge of the
database owner. Privacy concerns with the collection or storage of data
are therefore largely outside the scope of appropriation.46
Third, an action for public disclosure of private facts is unhelpful
for a plaintiff under this scenario, because the tort entails that the
information is distributed to the general public, not to an individual or
small group of people,47 as is often the case in a database security
breach. Furthermore, like intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure
of private facts is not applicable when the plaintiff voluntarily
provides information.48 Again, such an action may work against the
third-party hacker if he or she distributes the information publicly, but
will not work against the database owner.

43

Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights? 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 222-23 (1992).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 225.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 224.
48
Id. at 223-24.
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Lastly, the false light tort is inapplicable in this context because it
pertains only to the dissemination of inaccurate information;49 a
database owner provides accurate information in a database security
breach. As with public disclosure of private facts, the false light tort
also requires that the information be disclosed to the public,50 not to a
small group of people as occurs in most data breaches. A plaintiff
could use this tort against the third-party hacker, for example, if the
hacker publicly and fraudulently uses the plaintiff’s identity.
Parties who seek to hold database owners liable for wrongful
access to their personal information following a database breach thus
have limited means to do so under common law. Without an applicable
invasion of privacy tort, they must rely on claims of negligence and/or
breach of contract, as in Pisciotta. Although the requisite duty for a
negligence claim may be found through a contractual privacy policy or
fiduciary relationship, claims under negligence and/or breach of
contract remain very difficult to recover under because of the
plaintiffs’ burden to prove a compensable injury, as we will see in
Pisciotta. Recognizing the hurdles that consumers confront under
common law to protect their information privacy, we now turn to what
protection consumers have under federal and state regulation.
2. Federal Regulation
The United States currently has no comprehensive legislation
dealing with the collection of personal information. Consequently,
information privacy has been protected through a “patchwork of
Constitutional, statutory, common law and private sector guidelines,”
which has often proven ineffective.51 Congress has passed some
industry-specific statutes to control the use of personal information in
reaction to particular industry and consumer interests; however, these

49

Id. at 224-25.
Id.
51
Seth Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in
Cyberspace, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, ¶ 75 (2000).
50

667
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/8

10

Vranas-Liveris: Lost in Cyberspace: A Call for New Legislation to Fill the Black

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

statutes have not always been able to keep pace with advancing
technology to protect consumers’ privacy rights.52
Of some relevance in Pisciotta, which dealt with personal
information provided to a bank, is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(“GLBA”).53 The GLBA states that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress
that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing
obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the
security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal
information.”54 The GLBA accordingly requires certain agencies,
including the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities Exchange
Commission, to “establish appropriate standards for the financial
institutions subject to their jurisdiction” in order to 1) “insure the
security and confidentiality of customer records and information;” 2)
“protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or
integrity of such records;” and 3) “protect against unauthorized access
to or use of such records or information which could result in
substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.”55 The GLBA
further requires that financial institutions develop and give notice of
their privacy policies to their customers at least annually.56 Before a
financial institution may share personal information with certain
nonaffiliated companies, it must also provide its customers with the
ability to opt out of this disclosure.57 Although the GLBA is a move in
the right direction for federal information privacy regulation, it does
not create a private cause of action.58 Therefore, a customer cannot sue

52

Id. at ¶ 76.
Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
6801-6809 (2000).
54
15 U.S.C. § 6801(a).
55
15 U.S.C. § 6801(b).
56
15 U.S.C. § 6803(a).
57
15 U.S.C. § 6802(b).
58
Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 267 (2005).
53
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a financial institution for breaching its duty to protect the customer’s
personal information.59
Although there is not much federal guidance on information
privacy, particularly within the context of personal information stored
on databases, there is evidence that Congress realizes the growing
necessity to regulate this area. Specifically, there are a number of Bills
which are currently working their way through the political process.60
These include S. 239: Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act,61
H.R. 958: Data Accountability and Trust Act,62 H.R. 836: CyberSecurity Enhancement & Consumer Data Protection Act,63 and S. 495:
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007.64 These Bills contain
provisions which would establish requirements for data security65 and
breach notification,66 criminalize concealment of data breaches,67 preempt state laws,68 and delegate regulatory responsibility to the FTC.69
Notably, however, none of these Bills provide for a private cause of
action.
3. State Regulation
Considering the lack of regulation at the federal level, many states
have attempted to provide some guidance in regulating database
59

Id.
See Scott Berinato, Data Breach Notification Laws, State by State, CSO,
available at http://www.csoonline.com/read/020108/ammap/ammap.html.
61
S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007).
62
H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007).
63
H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007).
64
S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007).
65
S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007).
66
S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 239, 110th
Cong. (2007); H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007).
67
H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007).
68
S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 239, 110th
Cong. (2007); H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007).
69
S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 495, 110th
Cong. (2007).
60
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security. Most of these states have followed the lead of California,
which has the strongest privacy law in the country.70 For example, as
of January 2008, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
passed security breach notification laws,71 with California the first to
enact such a law in 2003.72 Most security breach notification laws, as
the one discussed in Pisciotta, require that companies which store
personal information notify individuals in the event of a security
breach where personal information is improperly accessed.73
Security breach notification laws became common following the
security breach of ChoicePoint, a data aggregation company, in
2004.74 At that time, California was the only state to have a
notification law, and ChoicePoint sent more than 30,000 letters to
California residents informing them that their personal information
had been improperly accessed.75 More than 145,000 consumers
nationwide were affected by the breach though, many of whom were
not notified of the breach due to lack of notification laws in their states
of residence.76 This incident caused many states to question their
privacy standards and to enact notification laws of their own.77
Despite the states’ efforts to create some protection for consumers’
personal information through security breach notification statutes,
consumers still have little means to ensure that their personal
information is protected. Most of the notification statutes are
extremely narrow in that they only create a duty to notify consumers
of a security breach and do not expressly create a duty generally to
protect data.78 Additionally, most of these statutes do not provide for
70

SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 227.
See State Security Notification Laws, National Conference of State
Legislatures, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm.
72
Security Breach Information Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (2003).
73
SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 228.
74
Id. at 255.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
71
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civil action by an affected consumer in the event that a database owner
breaches its duties under the statute.79 The California notification
statute is one of the few that both creates a data protection obligation
and authorizes civil action for damages in this situation.80
It is with this understanding of the limited protection of
information privacy in the context of database security breaches, and
the limited avenues for redress by affected consumers in these
situations, that we examine Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp.
II. PISCIOTTA V. OLD NATIONAL BANCORP
Luciano Pisciotta and Daniel Mills brought a class action on
behalf of customers and potential customers of Old National Bancorp
(“ONB”).81 They alleged that ONB failed to secure personal
information which had been solicited through ONB’s website from
applicants for banking services.82 Depending on the service requested,
customers or potential customers would provide their name, address,
Social Security number, driver’s license number, date of birth,
mother’s maiden name, and credit card or other financial account
numbers over the website.83 In 2005, as a result of ONB’s failed
security, a third-party computer hacker gained access to this private
information of tens of thousands of people who used ONB’s website.84
The security breach was found to be “sophisticated, intentional and
malicious.”85 ONB sent written notice to its customers of the intrusion,
once it was notified by the hosting facility, NCR.86
79

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3075 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1101 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(10) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-65(d) (2005).
80
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.81.5, 1798.84(b).
81
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2007).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 632.
86
Id.
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A. Procedural History
The plaintiffs brought an action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana, having jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.87 They alleged negligence claims
against ONB and NCR, as well as breach of implied contract against
ONB and breach of contract against NCR.88 They alleged that they
suffered “substantial potential economic damages and emotional
distress and worry that third parties [would] use [the plaintiffs’]
confidential personal information to cause them economic harm, or
sell their confidential information to others who [would] in turn cause
them economic harm.”89 The plaintiffs did not, however, claim any
“completed direct financial loss” nor that any member of the class
“already had been the victim of identity theft” because of the security
breach.90 The plaintiffs sought damages in the form of compensation
for past and future credit monitoring costs.91
The district court granted NCR’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, leaving ONB as the sole defendant.92 ONB moved for
judgment on the pleadings and opposed the plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification.93 The district court ruled in favor of ONB on both
motions, concluding that “the plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of
law because ‘they have not alleged that ONB’s conduct caused them
cognizable injury,’” where “under Indiana law, damages must be more

87

Id. at 633. Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d), the district court had jurisdiction over the case because at least one member
of the proposed class was a citizen of a state different from ONB (the class members
included residents of Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee)
and the matter in controversy exceeded five million dollars, exclusive of interest and
costs.
88
Pisciotta, 499 F.3d 629, at 632.
89
Id. (citing R.37 at 2).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 631.
92
Id. at 632.
93
Id.
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than speculative.”94 Furthermore, the district court concluded that
compensation for the cost of credit monitoring could not be an
“‘alternative award for what would otherwise be speculative and
unrecoverable damages,’” as the cost to monitors one’s credit is, “‘not
the result of any present injury, but rather the anticipation of the future
injury that has not yet materialized.’”95
The plaintiffs appealed the judgment for ONB on the negligence
and breach of implied contract claims to the Seventh Circuit, and also
requested that the Seventh Circuit vacate the order denying class
certification.96
B. Seventh Circuit Opinion
In an opinion written by Judge Ripple, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the
damages of past and future credit monitoring costs sought by the
plaintiffs were not compensable under Indiana law.97 Therefore, claims
for negligence and breach of implied contract failed as a matter of
law.98 The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de
novo because it was based on a 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings.99
1. A Quick Look at Jurisdiction
Having found jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, the court went on to review its subject matter jurisdiction over
the case.100 In an interesting precursor to its discussion on the merits,
the court noted that many federal courts (including those that the
94

Id. (citing R.78 at 3).
Id. (citing R.78 at 3-4).
96
Id. at 633.
97
Id. at 640.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 633.
100
Id. at 633-34.
95
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district court relied on in its reasoning) concluded that they did not
have jurisdiction in similar cases where the plaintiffs’ data had been
compromised but not yet misused, because these plaintiffs had not met
the injury-in-fact requirement for standing under Article III.101 The
court went on to say, however, that the injury-in-fact requirement of
Article III could be “satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act
which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm
that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s
actions.” Therefore, the court reasoned, it had jurisdiction over the
matter.102 In its following discussion, however, the court concluded
that this potential harm, which was enough to confer standing, was not
enough to bring a successful claim for negligence or breach of implied
contract.103
2. Was There Requisite Harm?
The main issue in Pisciotta was whether “the harm caused by
identity information exposure, coupled with the attendant costs to
guard against identity theft, constitutes an existing compensable injury
and consequent damages required to state a claim for negligence or for
breach of contract.”104 Stemming from this issue was the more general
question of whether Indiana would recognize a cause of action for a
data exposure injury,105 a question with substantial ramifications under
Indiana law, considering it had never been addressed.
Because the case was brought under diversity jurisdiction and
alleged causes of action under Indiana law, the court was required to
apply the substantive law of Indiana.106 As stated above, however,
there was no Indiana precedent addressing the issue at hand.107
101

Id. at 634.
Id.
103
Id. at 640.
104
Id. at 635.
105
Id. at 636.
106
Id. at 634.
107
Id. at 635.
102
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Therefore, the court was required to examine the case based on its
prediction of how the Supreme Court of Indiana would decide it.108 To
do this, the court considered 1) Indiana legislation on the issue,109
2) Indiana case law regarding analogous areas of the law,110 and 3) the
reasoning of other courts applying the law of other jurisdictions, but
on the same legal issue.111 Although the Seventh Circuit would look at
this range of sources for guidance, it emphasized that it would take a
restrictive approach to this “novel theory of liability.”112 The court
asserted, “Without state authority to guide us, ‘[w]hen given a choice
between an interpretation of [state] law which reasonably restricts
liability, and one which greatly expands liability, we should choose the
narrower and more reasonable path.’”113
a. Indiana Legislation
In deciding whether the plaintiffs had suffered the requisite harm
for a successful negligence or breach of contract claim, the court first
looked at Indiana legislation on the matter.114 Specifically, it examined
a statute which was enacted on March 21, 2006 and imposes certain
duties on private entities (as well as state agencies) if their databases
which contain personal information are accessed by unauthorized third
parties.115 The statute, in effect, is one of notification, requiring a
database owner who knows or should know of a security breach to
notify all potentially affected consumers of that breach.116 It further
requires the database owner to provide information to each consumer
108

Id.
Id. at 636-37.
110
Id. at 637-39.
111
Id. at 639-40.
112
Id. at 636.
113
Id. at 635-36 (quoting Todd v. Societe Vic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1412 (7th
Cir 1994)).
114
Id. at 636-37.
115
Id. at 636 (citing I.C. § 24-4.9 et seq.).
116
Id. at 637 n.6.
109
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reporting agency, where the breach potentially affects more than one
thousand consumers.117 It is interesting to note that the court
recognized that the statute took effect on July 1, 2006, after the
incident involved in Pisciotta, and thus was not directly relevant to the
case.118 Nonetheless, the court looked at the statute for guidance on
how the Indiana Supreme Court would rule on the matter.119
The Seventh Circuit noted that the Indiana statute requires no
affirmative act other than notification, and that if the database owner
fails to notify, enforcement actions may only be taken by the Attorney
General of Indiana.120 The court concluded, therefore, that the
legislation creates no private right of action by a consumer against the
database owner, and likewise creates “no duty to compensate affected
individuals for inconvenience or potential harm to credit.”121
Significantly, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute
is evidence of the Indiana legislature’s belief that an individual has
suffered a compensable injury when his or her personal information is
wrongfully acquired by a third party in a security breach.122 Rather, the
court concluded that the Indiana legislature would have made a
definite statement of its intent to create a cause of action in such a
situation.123
Having found no support for the plaintiffs’ allegations in light of
Indiana legislation, the court then turned to Indiana case law dealing
with analogous legal issues.124

117

Id.
Id. at 636-37.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 637.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 637-39.
118
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b. Indiana Case Law
The plaintiffs argued that there was Indiana case law in analogous
settings acknowledging that banks have a special duty to prevent
disclosure of their customers’ private information.125 They further
argued that Indiana courts recognized that failure to perform this duty
could result in harm to customers.126 The court quickly dismissed
these arguments, stating that the cases presented by the plaintiffs were
of “marginal assistance” because the facts of the cases were not
similar enough to the facts of the instant case.127 Specifically, the court
distinguished the cases cited by the plaintiffs by noting that the
plaintiffs in those cases were compensated for harm from injuries to
their reputation that were “direct and immediate,” whereas the
plaintiffs in Pisciotta sought compensation for “guarding against some
future, anticipated harm.”128
After dismissing the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding analogous
case law, the court, on its own, examined the possibly analogous case
law of toxic tort liability.129 In this setting, the court was able to find
precedent from the Supreme Court of Indiana implying that
“compensable damage requires more than an exposure to a future
potential harm.”130 It explained further that even courts allowing
medical monitoring damages, those being damages to monitor harm
after toxic exposure, showed doubt that there should be an allowance
for credit monitoring damages.131 Moreover, no Indiana courts were
125

Id. at 637-38.
Id. The plaintiffs cited Ind. Nat’l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1985) and Am. Fletcher Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 252 N.E.2d 839
(Ind. Ct. App. 1969).
127
Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 638.
128
Id.
129
The court, however, was careful to qualify this argument, stating that it did
not have to “endorse this analogy for present purposes.” Id. at 639.
130
Id. at 638-639 (citing Allied Signal, Inc. v. Ott, 785 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind.
2003)).
131
Id. at 639 (citing the Southern District of Ohio in Kahle v. Litton Loan
Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (S.D. Ohio 2007)).
126
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among those allowing medical monitoring damages.132 In fact, the
court contended that by looking at the Supreme Court of Indiana’s
treatment of toxic tort liability, it seemed that the Supreme Court of
Indiana actually “supports the view that no cause of action for credit
monitoring is available.”133
Again, having found no support for the plaintiffs’ cause of action,
and with no other authority from Indiana law, the Seventh Circuit
proceeded to examine the reasoning of other courts applying the law
of other jurisdictions, but to the same legal issue presented in
Pisciotta.
c. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions
The court listed a number of district court cases, including from
districts in Ohio, Minnesota, Arizona, and Michigan, where plaintiffs
with similar allegations to those in Pisciotta were denied damages
because they had not suffered the requisite harm.134 The court
concluded by stating that it would not “adopt a ‘substantive
innovation’ in state law or ‘[] invent what would be a truly novel tort
claim’ on behalf of the state absent some authority to suggest that the
approval of the Supreme Court of Indiana is forthcoming.” 135 This
was particularly in light of the fact that the plaintiffs had not brought
forth any case or statute authorizing the cause of action they sought
recovery under.136
132

Id.
Id. (citing Allied Signal, 785 N.E.2d 1068).
134
Id. (citing Kahle, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 712-13; Hendricks v. DSW Shoe
Warehouse, 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (W.D. Mich. 2006); Guin v. Brazos Higher
Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4846 (D. Minn. Feb. 7,
2006); Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. 03-0185, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 41054 (D. Ariz. Sept. 8, 2005)).
135
Id. at 640 (quoting Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir.
2004) and Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 607 (7th Cir. 2000); and
citing Birchler v. Gehl Co., 88 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1996) and Ry Express
Agency, Inc. v. Super Scale Models, Ltd., 934 F.2d 135, 138 (7th Cir. 1991)).
136
Id. at 639-40.
133
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III. COULD PISCIOTTA HAVE COME OUT DIFFERENTLY?
The Seventh Circuit made clear in Pisciotta that it would not
recognize a claim to recover past and future credit monitoring
damages from a database owner following a database security breach,
where the only harm suffered was the wrongful access of the plaintiffs’
personal information, and where no identity theft or other fraud
resulted. Despite the Seventh Circuit’s definite language in reaching
this conclusion, it is valuable to explore whether Pisciotta could have
come out differently for the plaintiff consumers (and consequently for
similarly situated consumers in future cases). In particular, we look at
whether the plaintiffs could have recovered by analogizing their injury
to that suffered in a toxic tort claim. We also look at whether the court
could have disregarded the economic loss doctrine, which limits
economic recovery in negligence actions. Through this analysis, we
recognize that a favorable result for the plaintiffs was possible in
theory, but not in practice. Plaintiffs therefore need to look to new
legislation, as discussed in Part IV, in order to recover credit
monitoring damages in these situations.
A. Analogizing to Toxic Tort Liability
An interesting argument that the plaintiffs in Pisciotta failed to
make, but that the Seventh Circuit raised on its own, was whether an
injury could be found by analogizing data breach liability to toxic tort
liability.137 Multiple state and federal courts have allowed victims of
toxic exposure, without proof of further injury caused by the exposure,
to recover medical monitoring damages.138 If the analogy between
137

Id. at 638-39.
Johnson, supra note 58, at 307-08 (citing Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem.
Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Witherspoon v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
964 F. Supp. 455, 467 (D.D.C. 1997); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the
Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. 1997);Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 836
P.2d 795, 824-25 (Cal. 1993)). See also, In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d
829 (3d Cir. 1990); Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746
F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Patton v. Gen. Signal Corp., 984 F. Supp. 666 (W.D.
138
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toxic exposure and exposure of personal information to identity theft is
accepted, it follows that these courts could also allow for the recovery
of credit monitoring damages.
The analogy is as follows: a consumer who loses personal
information due to a database security breach is like a person who
suffers exposure to a toxic substance in that both risk greater harm to
their person as a result of this occurrence.139 In the case of toxic
exposure, the exposed party has increased chances of having a disease,
while in the case of a database security breach, the exposed consumer
has increased chances of falling victim to identity theft and fraud.140 In
either case, the victim of the exposure is in the best position to
mitigate future harm by, in the least, monitoring the risk of the future
harm.141
In theory, because there was no Indiana authority on awarding
credit monitoring damages, the Seventh Circuit could have looked at
other jurisdictions, including those that have accepted medical
monitoring damages, and used this authority to support a finding for
credit monitoring damages under Indiana law. The Supreme Court of
Indiana, however, had spoken to the issue of awarding damages in a
toxic exposure case.142 The Supreme Court of Indiana ruled in Allied
Signal, Inc. v. Ott that “no compensable injury occurs at the time of
[toxic] exposure.”143 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit was constrained to
this ruling. Although other states have allowed medical monitoring
N.Y. 1997); Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 876 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. N.Y.
1995); Bocook v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 819 F. Supp 530 (S.D. W. Va. 1993); Bower v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 522 S.E. 2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999); Bourgeois v.
A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So.2d 355 (La. 1998); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d
232 (Pa. 1996); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993);
Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A. 2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993); Ayers v. Jackson Twp.,
525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App.
1987).
139
Johnson, supra note 58, at 308.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 639 (citing Allied Signal, Inc. v. Ott, 785 N.E.2d
1068 (Ind. 2003)).
143
Id. (citing Allied Signal, 785 N.E.2d at 1075).
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damages, Indiana is not one of them.144 Therefore, even if the Seventh
Circuit found the analogy to be apt, which it did not take a position on,
it would be forced to conclude that credit monitoring damages were
not available following a database security breach, just as medical
monitoring damages were not available following toxic exposure.145
Still, this leaves the door open for actions seeking credit
monitoring damages brought to the Seventh Circuit under other states’
laws. For example, it remains largely unsettled in Illinois whether
medical monitoring damages are available without physical injury.146
Therefore, it is possible, though still rather unlikely, that the Seventh
Circuit could recognize credit monitoring damages in a case brought
under Illinois law, if the court accepted the analogy to medical
monitoring damages.
B. Economic Loss Doctrine
The plaintiffs in Pisciotta also could have made the argument that
the standard for proving compensable injury should have been
broadened in the context of a database security breach because the
economic loss doctrine, which effectively narrows the standard, is not
implicated in this context. The economic loss doctrine states that in
order for a plaintiff to recover economic losses resulting from a
defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff must have suffered physical harm
to his or her person or property.147 This doctrine, although having its
roots in product liability, is applicable in most negligence cases and
may effectively limit recovery in tort cases involving internet security,
as implicitly illustrated in Pisciotta. The concept of physical harm to
144

Id.
Id. at 639 n.10.
146
Guillory v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 97 C 8641, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3353
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2001); Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. LLC, No. 96 C 8583, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16232 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1999); Campbell v. A.C. Equip. Servs.
Corp., Inc., 610 N.E.2d 745, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
147
See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986);
Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) (Chief Justice Roger Traynor is
credited with first articulating the doctrine in this landmark decision).
145
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one’s person or property is a questionable one though in the context of
cybertorts, and it is for this reason that we need to evaluate the purpose
and value of the economic loss doctrine in this context.
The economic loss doctrine has three significant functions: 1) to
protect a defendant from a disproportionately wide range of liability,148
2) to ensure that damages are proven with certainty, and 3) to define a
doctrinal boundary between tort and contract law.149 If one looks only
at the damages requested in Pisciotta, the costs of credit monitoring,
one realizes that the functions of the economic loss doctrine are not
met. The doctrine is thus an unnecessary limitation on recovery in this
context.
First, the scope of liability in Pisciotta is not in question. Limiting
the scope of a defendant’s liability is certainly crucial in tort law,
considering that “acts of negligence often have extremely broad
adverse economic consequences.”150 This is also the reason why most
jurisdictions require proof of proximate causation in a negligence
action. A defendant otherwise could be sued by parties having almost
no relation to the negligent act. In Pisciotta, however, the plaintiffs
were all customers or potential customers of ONB who had provided
ONB with personal information.151 It was consequently the
information of these plaintiffs that was stolen through the security
breach of ONB’s database.152 As such, the liability of the defendant is
restricted to ONB’s customers.
Second, the plaintiffs in Pisciotta could prove their requested
damages with certainty. This is not a situation where the court must
calculate lost economic opportunity, a situation that the economic loss
doctrine most directly addresses under this function. By requiring that
damages be proven with reasonable certainty, the economic loss
doctrine not only ensures that defendants not pay for speculative
148

See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic
Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1533 (1985).
149
Johnson, supra note 58, at 296.
150
Id. at 296-97.
151
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2007).
152
Id.
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amounts, it also “promotes judicious use of limited judicial resources,
ensuring that those scarce assets are not squandered on the
burdensome, and perhaps dubious, task of trying to quantify endless
economic losses that may, in truth, not be provable with reasonable
precision.”153 In Pisciotta, however, the plaintiffs would merely need
to present receipts or online invoices showing the cost of past and, to
the extent reasonable, future credit monitoring services they used or
would use following the security breach of ONB’s database. One can
go to the website of almost any credit monitoring service provider and
find the price for services, which generally range from ten to fifteen
dollars per individual per month.154 Therefore, damages could be
limited to this amount, protecting ONB from paying mere speculative
amounts.
Lastly, as argued by Professor Vincent Johnson, providing a
plaintiff with the costs of credit monitoring after a database security
breach, as requested in Pisciotta, would not pose a problem in
delineating between tort and contract law.155 Professor Johnson
explains that the protection of personal information in databases
should not be an area of bargaining between consumers and database
owners.156 The majority of states, through their data breach
notification statutes, seem to support this idea.157 Even though
database owners may have privacy policies that must be accepted by
consumers, consumers should not be able to contract out of their right
to sue for credit monitoring costs through these policies. Furthermore,
plaintiffs arguing breach of contract in these situations would likely be
unable to recover credit monitoring costs if they were not expressly
contracted for, because they would be considered consequential
damages, which are generally difficult to recover if not contemplated
153

Johnson, supra note 58, at 297-98 (citing Vincent R. Johnson & Alan Gunn,
STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 7, 9 (3d ed. 2005)).
154
See, e.g., http://www.equifax.com/credit-product-list/;
http://www.truecredit.com; http://www.identityguard.com.
155
Johnson, supra note 58, at 300-01.
156
Id.
157
Id.
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at the time of contract formation.158 Rather, tort law is better equipped
to provide for recovery of the cost of credit monitoring, where
compensation would depend on the reasonableness of these costs in
the context of each case.159
In all, the plaintiffs in Pisciotta could have argued that courts
should not be limited by the economic loss doctrine when deciding
whether plaintiffs have suffered the requisite compensable injury in a
data security breach case where the consequent damages are the cost
of credit monitoring, because the functions of the economic loss
doctrine are not implicated in this context. Nonetheless, considering
that the Seventh Circuit traditionally has espoused the economic loss
doctrine, with Judge Posner as one of its strongest advocates,160 this
argument would not ensure the plaintiffs in Pisciotta recovery of credit
monitoring costs.
IV. WHERE DO CONSUMERS GO FROM HERE?
Following Pisciotta, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit is not
willing to find a common law cause of action under tort law, at least in
Indiana, to provide credit monitoring costs to consumers who have lost
personal information due to a database security breach. The court
noted in Pisciotta that allowing for recovery of credit monitoring costs
after a security breach would constitute a “substantive innovation” in
state law, and the court justifiably refused to do this.161 In the short
time since Pisciotta was decided, it has already been followed by a
district court in the Fifth Circuit,162 having ruled that consumers need
to prove more than wrongful access to their personal information to
158

Id. at 301 n.307.
Id. at 301.
160
See Miller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1990); Rardin v. T &
D Mach. Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Thomas J. Miles,
Posner on Economic Loss in Tort: EVRA Corp v Swiss Bank, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1813 (2007); Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735 (2006).
161
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 640 (7th Cir. 2007).
162
Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 793 (M.D. La. 2007).
159
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recover under tort law, and that credit monitoring costs are thus not
compensable damages.163 As noted above, there are also other district
courts, including in Ohio,164 Minnesota,165 Arizona,166 and Michigan167
which decided, prior to Pisciotta, that credit monitoring costs are not
recoverable after a database security breach. Although there is thus
reason to believe that consumers in many states will not be able to
recover credit monitoring costs through common law when the
consumers’ personal information is wrongfully accessed, the issue
remains whether consumers should be able to recover credit
monitoring costs despite the court decisions. If so, their best prospect
for recovery is through new legislation.
A. Why Require Credit Monitoring Services?
Legislatures should require that database owners offer credit
monitoring services to all consumers whose personal information has
been wrongfully accessed due to a database security breach. This
would be advantageous to database owners as well as consumers.
In 2007, the average cost to a database owner following a
database security breach by a third-party hacker was $231 per
compromised record (this cost is even greater for financial institutions
where consumers have higher expectations of security).168 The cost of
lost business due to customer turnover accounted for about 56% of this
total cost, and the cost of providing credit monitoring accounted for
only 1%.169 One must note that even though a database owner may
163

Id. at 797.
Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
165
Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4846 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006).
166
Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. 03-0185, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 41054 (D. Ariz. Sept. 8, 2005).
167
Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, 444 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Mich.
2006).
168
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offer credit monitoring services, only about five to thirty percent of the
affected consumers actually exercises this offer, which translates to the
database owner’s cost.170 Therefore, a database owner’s greatest
concern following a security breach is the loss of customers.
By requiring that database owners provide credit monitoring
services, consumers may be more sympathetic to the database owners
(particularly in the case of a breach by a third-party hacker) and thus
give a second thought to transferring their business. Furthermore, by
offering credit monitoring services, database owners could potentially
save future legal costs related to a security breach. Many companies
already voluntarily provide affected consumers with credit monitoring
after database security breaches, recognizing the potential liability if
such monitoring does not take place.171 After all, credit monitoring
decreases affected consumers’ risks of falling victim to identity theft
and other fraud. Providing for credit monitoring services, though less
of a cost than other potential liability, would still be a considerable
expense for database owners, and therefore would also create an
incentive for these owners to increase database security. With this
increase in security, database owners will likely see an increase in their
online business because consumers will feel that their personal
information is being better protected.
For affected consumers, such legislation would at least provide
compensation for out-of-pocket expenses. As seen in Pisciotta,
consumers face an up-hill battle in protecting information privacy
through common law. Unless they are victims of identity theft or other
actual fraud, consumers will have significant difficulty receiving even
those out-of-pocket expenses through a negligence or breach of
contract action considering, among other difficulties, the high standard
of proving a compensable injury. Affected consumers of a database
security breach may also find it difficult in a negligence action, for
170
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example, to prove proximate causation, because the intentionally
tortious or criminal conduct of a hacker may break the chain of
causation, thus absolving the database owner of liability.172 As stated
above, requiring database owners to provide credit monitoring services
following a database breach will also likely improve database security,
which surely is advantageous for consumers providing personal
information online.
B. Other Proposed Legislation
Professor Vincent Johnson proposes legislation which would
allow consumers to recover credit monitoring costs when their
personal information is wrongfully accessed, provided that these credit
monitoring costs are a limitation on a database owner’s liability.173 The
fact that most states have enacted security breach notification statutes
illustrates that there is a recognized privacy interest in the personal
information provided to the database owners.174 In practice, however,
the notification statutes provide limited protection, because many of
these statutes do not ensure that affected consumers receive the most
expedient notice which is crucial in minimizing harm following a
security breach.175 Database owners are generally only obligated to
notify consumers of a database breach upon actual discovery or
notification of the breach, when in reality they may be able to discover
the breach earlier, yet have no incentive to do so.176 By introducing
credit monitoring costs as a statutory remedy and a limitation on
liability, database owners will have an incentive to discover security
breaches as early as possible so as to shift liability to the consumer as
early as possible.177 Once a database owner notifies an affected
172
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173
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consumer of a security breach, the database owner would only be
liable for credit monitoring costs from that point and for no other
liabilities resulting from the security breach.
The advantages for database owners and for consumers are, for
the most part, the same as those from legislation without a cap on
liability. For database owners, however, limiting liability to credit
monitoring costs is even more advantageous than simply requiring
credit monitoring costs because it would necessarily prevent
devastating liability from subsequent legal actions.178 Without this cap,
their risk of liability is merely decreased.
Consumers, on the other hand, do face the disadvantage of not
being able to bring a negligence claim against the database owner once
they have actually suffered financial injury through identity theft or
fraud. On the whole, however, the majority of affected consumers will
not fall victim to identity theft or fraud, and would prefer some redress
following a security breach than none. Furthermore, with free credit
monitoring services, consumers should be less likely to fall victim to
identity theft in the first place, consequently lessening this
disadvantage.
CONCLUSION
Pisciotta is a fascinating case because it highlights the difficulties
plaintiffs face when the law does not necessarily keep up with the
advancement of technology. Indeed, Pisciotta presented the Seventh
Circuit with an issue it had never faced: whether the costs of credit
monitoring spent by consumers whose personal information was
wrongfully accessed through a database security breach, but who were
not victims of identity theft or fraud, are compensable damages and
thus recoverable under a negligence or breach of contract action. The
Seventh Circuit was unwilling to extend the definition of compensable
damages to the costs of credit monitoring in this situation, and
definitively refused to create a common law cause of action for such
damages.
178

Id. at 309.
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Following Pisciotta then, individuals in Indiana whose personal
information is wrongfully accessed because of a database security
breach effectively have no avenue of redress unless they fall victim to
identity theft or other fraud. Although this is a rather narrow reading of
Pisciotta, it can easily be broadened to encompass other states in the
Seventh Circuit and even beyond the Seventh Circuit because of the
similar state of the law regarding database security breaches. Most
states have security breach notification laws, but do not require
database owners to provide affected consumers with credit monitoring
services. If other circuits follow the Seventh Circuit in refusing credit
monitoring damages, there will not only be lack of redress through
regulation, but lack of redress through the common law. Consumers
therefore need to rely on their legislators to create statutory credit
monitoring damages, if they are to receive them at all.
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